• xmlui.mirage2.page-structure.header.title
    • français
    • English
  • Help
  • Login
  • Language 
    • Français
    • English
View Item 
  •   BIRD Home
  • LEDa (UMR CNRS 8007, UMR IRD 260)
  • LEDa : Publications
  • View Item
  •   BIRD Home
  • LEDa (UMR CNRS 8007, UMR IRD 260)
  • LEDa : Publications
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Browse

BIRDResearch centres & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesTypeThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesType

My Account

LoginRegister

Statistics

Most Popular ItemsStatistics by CountryMost Popular Authors
Thumbnail

Improving take-up of health insurance program: a social experiment in France

Guthmuller, Sophie; Jusot, Florence; Wittwer, Jérôme (2014), Improving take-up of health insurance program: a social experiment in France, The Journal of Human Resources, 49, 1, p. 167-194

View/Open
cahierwittwer.pdf (388.6Kb)
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2014
Journal name
The Journal of Human Resources
Volume
49
Number
1
Publisher
University of Wisconsin Press
Pages
167-194
40
Metadata
Show full item record
Author(s)
Guthmuller, Sophie

Jusot, Florence

Wittwer, Jérôme
Abstract (EN)
This paper is based on a randomised social experiment conducted in order to understand the low take-up rate of a Complementary health-insurance voucher program for the poorest in France (the Aide Complémentaire Santé: ACS). We explore two of the main hypotheses put forward to explain low enrolment: a lack of information about the program and a voucher amount considered to be too low. A sample of eligible individuals living in an urban area in Northern France were randomly split into three groups: a control group who benefited from the standard level of financial aid; a group benefiting from an increase in the value of the voucher; and a third group benefiting from the same increase along with an invitation to an information meeting regarding ACS. We show that the voucher increase has a small but statistically significant effect on ACS take-up. The invitation to the meeting appears to cancel out the positive effect of the voucher increase. Using an instrumental variable model to control for potential selection bias, we find ambiguous evidence of the meeting attendance on ACS take-up. This study confirms the difficulties that are faced in increasing the healthinsurance coverage of poor populations via subsidy programs.
Subjects / Keywords
Subsidised health insurance; take-up; randomised experiment; uninsured; low-income population; France
JEL
I38 - Government Policy; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
I18 - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
C93 - Field Experiments

Related items

Showing items related by title and author.

  • Thumbnail
    L'accès aux soins des populations modestes en France : études micro-économétriques des comportements de recours à la complémentaire santé et aux soins 
    Guthmuller, Sophie (2013-09) Thèse
  • Thumbnail
    Affordability of complementary health insurance in France : a social experiment 
    Guthmuller, Sophie; Wittwer, Jérôme; Jusot, Florence (2011) Communication / Conférence
  • Thumbnail
    Just a question of time? Explaining non-take-up of a public health insurance program designed for undocumented immigrants living in France 
    Dourgnon, Paul; Jusot, Florence; Marsaudon, Antoine; Sarhiri, Jawar; Wittwer, Jérôme (2023) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
  • Thumbnail
    Faire valoir ses droits à l'Aide complémentaire santé : les résultats d'une expérimentation sociale 
    Guthmuller, Sophie; Jusot, Florence; Wittwer, Jérôme; Després, Caroline (2013) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
  • Thumbnail
    Le recours à l’Aide complémentaire santé : les enseignements d’une expérimentation sociale à Lille 
    Guthmuller, Sophie; Jusot, Florence; Wittwer, Jérôme; Després, Caroline (2011-02) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Dauphine PSL Bibliothèque logo
Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny 75775 Paris Cedex 16
Phone: 01 44 05 40 94
Contact
Dauphine PSL logoEQUIS logoCreative Commons logo