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Crossing takeover premiums and mix of payment: An empirical test of contractual setting in M&A transactions

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De-La-Bruslerie.pdf (238.2Kb)
Date
2012
Indexation documentaire
Organisation et finances d'entreprise
Subject
M&A; takeover premium; means of payment; contract setting
Code JEL
G.G3.G34; G.G3.G32
Titre du colloque
Behavioural Finance Working Group/M&A Research Centre Conference : "Behavioural Finance and Cross Border Investments and Acquisitions"
Date du colloque
06-2012
Ville du colloque
Londres
Pays du colloque
United Kingdom
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/9668
Collections
  • DRM : Publications
Métadonnées
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Auteur
de La Bruslerie, Hubert
1032 Dauphine Recherches en Management [DRM]
Type
Communication / Conférence
Nombre de pages du document
44
Résumé en anglais
The analyses of the tender offer premiums and of the means of payment should not be performed separately. In the empirical literature, these two variables are often considered independently, although they may have an endogenous relationship in a contractual setting. Using a sample of European M&As over the 2000-2010 decade, we show that these two variables are jointly set in a contractual empirical approach. The relationship between the percentage of cash and the offer premium is positive: higher premiums yield payments with more cash. We highlight that the payment choice is not a continuum between full cash and full share payments. Two different regimes of payment in M&A transactions are empirically characterized. We analyze the major determinants of M&A terms when the offer premium and the means of payment are jointly set. The underlying rationale of an asymmetry of information and a risk-sharing calculus is found to be significant in the setting of the agreement.

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 Cette création est mise à disposition sous un contrat Creative Commons.