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Are evolutionary games another way of thinking about game theory ? Some historical considerations

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Date
2004
Dewey
Economie politique
Sujet
Jeux, Théorie des; Histoire économique; Économie évolutionniste
Journal issue
Journal of Evolutionary Economics
Volume
14
Number
2
Publication date
2004
Article pages
249-262
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/9661
Collections
  • IRISSO : Publications
Metadata
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Author
Schmidt, Christian
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
Evolutionary games really appeared in the field of economics at the beginning of the nineties. More than sixty years previously, V. Volterra published several papers on population dynamics which captured species evolution in a game-theoretical fashion. The second round of the history starts with J.F. Nash., who probably ignored E. Borel's works on games and took up his challenge. Nash's approach seems to reconcile Borel's and Volterra's approaches to a game situation. A Nash equilibrium is defined as a rational situation, by reference to a stable situation. In a Nash equilibrium, no player has an incentive to deviate.

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