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dc.contributor.authorBonzon, Elise*
dc.contributor.authorLagasquie-Schiex, Marie-Christine*
dc.contributor.authorLang, Jérôme*
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-25T13:03:09Z
dc.date.available2012-06-25T13:03:09Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/9569
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectGame theoryen
dc.subjectPropositional logicen
dc.subjectCoalitionsen
dc.subject.ddc519en
dc.titleEffectivity functions and efficient coalitions in Boolean gamesen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenBoolean games are a logical setting for representing strategic games in a succinct way, taking advantage of the expressive power and conciseness of propositional logic. A Boolean game consists of a set of players, each of which controls a set of propositional variables and has a specific goal expressed by a propositional formula. We show here that Boolean games are a very simple setting, yet sophisticated enough, for analysing the formation of coalitions. Due to the fact that players have dichotomous preferences, the following notion emerges naturally: a coalition in a Boolean game is efficient if it has the power to guarantee that all goals of the members of the coalition are satisfied. We study the properties of efficient coalitions.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameSynthese
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol187
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissuesupp. 1
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue73-103
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2012
dc.relation.isversionofdoi10.1007/s11229-012-0130-yen
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherSpringeren
dc.subject.ddclabelProbabilités et mathématiques appliquéesen
dc.description.halcandidateoui
dc.description.readershiprecherche
dc.description.audienceInternational
dc.relation.Isversionofjnlpeerreviewedoui
hal.person.labIds103372*
hal.person.labIds34499*
hal.person.labIds989*
hal.identifierhal-01509974*


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