• français
    • English
  • English 
    • français
    • English
  • Login
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.
BIRD Home

Browse

This CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsJournals BIRDResearch centres & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsJournals

My Account

Login

Statistics

View Usage Statistics

Effectivity functions and efficient coalitions in Boolean games

Thumbnail
Date
2012
Dewey
Probabilités et mathématiques appliquées
Sujet
Game theory; Propositional logic; Coalitions
Journal issue
Synthese
Volume
187
Number
supp. 173-103
Publication date
2012
Publisher
Springer
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0130-y
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/9569
Collections
  • LAMSADE : Publications
Metadata
Show full item record
Author
Bonzon, Elise
103372 Laboratoire d'Informatique Paris Descartes [LIPADE - EA 2517]
Lagasquie-Schiex, Marie-Christine
34499 Institut de recherche en informatique de Toulouse [IRIT]
Lang, Jérôme
989 Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
Boolean games are a logical setting for representing strategic games in a succinct way, taking advantage of the expressive power and conciseness of propositional logic. A Boolean game consists of a set of players, each of which controls a set of propositional variables and has a specific goal expressed by a propositional formula. We show here that Boolean games are a very simple setting, yet sophisticated enough, for analysing the formation of coalitions. Due to the fact that players have dichotomous preferences, the following notion emerges naturally: a coalition in a Boolean game is efficient if it has the power to guarantee that all goals of the members of the coalition are satisfied. We study the properties of efficient coalitions.

  • Accueil Bibliothèque
  • Site de l'Université Paris-Dauphine
  • Contact
SCD Paris Dauphine - Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny 75775 Paris Cedex 16

 Content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.0 France (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) license.