Effectivity functions and efficient coalitions in Boolean games

Bonzon, Elise; Lagasquie-Schiex, Marie-Christine; Lang, Jérôme

Bonzon, Elise; Lagasquie-Schiex, Marie-Christine; Lang, Jérôme (2012), Effectivity functions and efficient coalitions in Boolean games, Synthese, 187, supp. 1. 10.1007/s11229-012-0130-y

Type

Article accepté pour publication ou publié

Date

2012

Journal name

Synthese

Volume

187

Number

supp. 1; 73-103

Publisher

Springer

Publication identifier

10.1007/s11229-012-0130-y

Metadata

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Author(s)

Bonzon, Elise
Laboratoire d'Informatique Paris Descartes [LIPADE - EA 2517]
Lagasquie-Schiex, Marie-Christine

Institut de recherche en informatique de Toulouse [IRIT]
Lang, Jérôme
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision [LAMSADE]

Abstract (EN)

Boolean games are a logical setting for representing strategic games in a succinct way, taking advantage of the expressive power and conciseness of propositional logic. A Boolean game consists of a set of players, each of which controls a set of propositional variables and has a specific goal expressed by a propositional formula. We show here that Boolean games are a very simple setting, yet sophisticated enough, for analysing the formation of coalitions. Due to the fact that players have dichotomous preferences, the following notion emerges naturally: a coalition in a Boolean game is efficient if it has the power to guarantee that all goals of the members of the coalition are satisfied. We study the properties of efficient coalitions.

Subjects / Keywords

Game theory; Propositional logic; Coalitions