Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorBelot, François*
dc.contributor.authorGinglinger, Edith*
dc.contributor.authorSlovin, Myron*
dc.contributor.authorSushka, Marie*
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-23T15:27:00Z
dc.date.available2012-06-23T15:27:00Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/9554
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectmonitoring
dc.subjectsupervisory board
dc.subjectcorporate governance
dc.subjectdual board
dc.subjectmanagement board
dc.subjectunitary board
dc.subjectBoard of directors
dc.subject.ddc658.1en
dc.subject.classificationjelG.G3.G34en
dc.subject.classificationjelG.G3.G32en
dc.titleLessons from The French Exception: How Firms Choose Between Unitary and Dual Boards
dc.typeCommunication / Conférence
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherArizona State University;États-Unis
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherUniversité Cergy-Pontoise;France
dc.description.abstractenMany governance reform proposals focus on strengthening board monitoring. In contrast, Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Harris and Raviv (2008) conclude that a passive board is often optimal. We examine determinants of board structure choice in France, where firms are free to choose between a unitary (passive) board and a dual (monitoring) board. We find firms with greater asymmetric information are likely to adopt a unitary board. Firms with a high potential for private benefit extraction are likely to adopt dual boards. Firms well monitored by financial market and institutional forces are less likely to have dual boards. Our results imply that freedom of contract about board structure is valuable for shareholders.
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelOrganisation et finances d'entrepriseen
dc.relation.conftitle2012 FMA European Conference
dc.relation.confdate2012-06
dc.relation.confcityIstanbul
dc.relation.confcountryTURKEY
dc.description.ssrncandidatenon
dc.description.halcandidateoui
dc.description.readershiprecherche
dc.description.audienceInternational
dc.date.updated2017-01-13T17:38:00Z
hal.person.labIds1098*
hal.person.labIds1032*
hal.person.labIds56706*
hal.person.labIds36796*
hal.identifierhal-01637565*


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record