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dc.contributor.authorForges, Françoise
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-21T13:48:21Z
dc.date.available2012-05-21T13:48:21Z
dc.date.issued2011-09
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/9258
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectBayesian gameen
dc.subjectcommitmenten
dc.subjectcontracten
dc.subjectincentive compatibilityen
dc.subjectinterim individual rationalityen
dc.subject.ddc338.5en
dc.subject.classificationjelC70en
dc.titleBayesian games with contractsen
dc.typeDocument de travail / Working paper
dc.description.abstractenThe set of all Bayesian-Nash equilibrium payoffs that the players can achieve by signing (conditional) commitments before playing a Bayesian game coincides with the set of all feasible, incentive compatible and interim individually rational payoffs of the Bayesian game. Furthermore, the various equilibrium payoffs, which are achieved by means of different commitment devices, are also the equilibrium pay- offs of a universal, deterministic commitment game.en
dc.publisher.nameUniversité Paris- Dauphineen
dc.publisher.cityParisen
dc.identifier.citationpages14en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelMicroéconomieen


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