Bayesian games with contracts
Forges, Françoise (2011-09), Bayesian games with contracts. https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/9258
TypeDocument de travail / Working paper
Université Paris- Dauphine
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Abstract (EN)The set of all Bayesian-Nash equilibrium payoffs that the players can achieve by signing (conditional) commitments before playing a Bayesian game coincides with the set of all feasible, incentive compatible and interim individually rational payoffs of the Bayesian game. Furthermore, the various equilibrium payoffs, which are achieved by means of different commitment devices, are also the equilibrium pay- offs of a universal, deterministic commitment game.
Subjects / KeywordsBayesian game; commitment; contract; incentive compatibility; interim individual rationality
JELC70 - General
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