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dc.contributor.authorLazega, Emmanuel
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-27T12:37:12Z
dc.date.available2012-04-27T12:37:12Z
dc.date.issued2001
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/9069
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectRelations interorganisationnellesen
dc.subjectSociologie des organisationsen
dc.subject.ddc306.3en
dc.titleWho guards the guardians ? Protecting a lateral control regime from its own oligarchsen
dc.typeChapitre d'ouvrage
dc.description.abstractenThe purpose of this paper is to combine insights from collective action theory and from a structural approach to contribute to a theory of control among peers. Drawing on a network study of a medium-sized Northeastern corporate law firm, I show that partners — all formally equal and locked in a cooperative situation — have developed an informal pattern of “lateral control” to help protect their common interests against free loading due to individual expressive problems. This pattern helps peers exercise early monitoring and sanctioning by providing status-based guidance for choices of “sanctioners” who exercise pressure on behalf of the firm. The analysis identifies partners who are most likely to be chosen as sanctioners, offers structural hypotheses to explain these choices, and outlines the implications of these findings for a theory of cooperation among peers.en
dc.identifier.citationpages263-291en
dc.relation.ispartoftitleSocial Capital of Organizationsen
dc.relation.ispartofeditorLeenders, Roger Th. A. J.
dc.relation.ispartofeditorGabbay, Shaul M.
dc.relation.ispartofpublnameJAIen
dc.relation.ispartofpublcityAmsterdamen
dc.relation.ispartofdate2001
dc.relation.ispartofpages291en
dc.identifier.urlsitehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0733-558X(01)18011-0en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelSociologie économiqueen
dc.relation.ispartofisbn0-7623-0770-6en


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