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Who guards the guardians ? Protecting a lateral control regime from its own oligarchs

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Date
2001
Link to item file
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0733-558X(01)18011-0
Dewey
Sociologie économique
Sujet
Relations interorganisationnelles; Sociologie des organisations
Book title
Social Capital of Organizations
Author
Leenders, Roger Th. A. J.; Gabbay, Shaul M.
Publisher
JAI
Publisher city
Amsterdam
Year
2001
Pages number
291
ISBN
0-7623-0770-6
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/9069
Collections
  • IRISSO : Publications
Metadata
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Author
Lazega, Emmanuel
Type
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Item number of pages
263-291
Abstract (EN)
The purpose of this paper is to combine insights from collective action theory and from a structural approach to contribute to a theory of control among peers. Drawing on a network study of a medium-sized Northeastern corporate law firm, I show that partners — all formally equal and locked in a cooperative situation — have developed an informal pattern of “lateral control” to help protect their common interests against free loading due to individual expressive problems. This pattern helps peers exercise early monitoring and sanctioning by providing status-based guidance for choices of “sanctioners” who exercise pressure on behalf of the firm. The analysis identifies partners who are most likely to be chosen as sanctioners, offers structural hypotheses to explain these choices, and outlines the implications of these findings for a theory of cooperation among peers.

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