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dc.contributor.authorMounier, Lise
dc.contributor.authorLazega, Emmanuel
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-26T12:43:02Z
dc.date.available2012-04-26T12:43:02Z
dc.date.issued2003
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/9062
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectJugesen
dc.subjectTribunal de commerce de Parisen
dc.subjectRelations interorganisationnellesen
dc.subject.ddc306.3en
dc.titleInterlocking judges : on joint exogenous and self-governance of marketsen
dc.typeChapitre d'ouvrage
dc.description.abstractenThis study stresses the importance of considering a “joint” governance of interfirm relations as an alternative to external governance (by the State) and self-governance (by the business community) of these relations. We argue that a broadly-conceived structural and organizational approach to economic institutions provides insights into this joint governance because it shows how such a system spreads the costs of control among several kinds of stakeholders. We look at how transactions between any two firms are regulated through jurisdiction by “consular” judges (i.e. judges elected through the local Chamber of Commerce) who indirectly represent other firms and industries in that market, and are therefore considered to be at the same time third parties and potential levers of influence acting on behalf of corporate interests. We study an empirical case of such joint governance: The Tribunal of Commerce of Paris (TCP). Following previous work on lateral control and leverage, we hypothesize that industries and/or companies that have a strong stake in the conflict resolution process will be more represented among the judges of this court than other industries and/or companies, and that judges who are socially active in the court that enforces this joint governance will be sought out for advice more than other judges, and thus gain influence on their peers by suggesting specific outcomes. The analyses of the composition of the bench and of the advice network data collected in this court display an influence structure that confirms these hypotheses and that is likely to affect conflict resolution between businesses. It thus characterizes joint governance of markets as a complex set of social processes worthy of economic sociologists’ attention.en
dc.identifier.citationpages267-296en
dc.relation.ispartoftitlehe Governance of Relations in Markets and Organizationsen
dc.relation.ispartofeditorSnijders, Chris
dc.relation.ispartofeditorRaub, Werner
dc.relation.ispartofeditorBuskens, Vincent
dc.relation.ispartofpublnameJAIen
dc.relation.ispartofpublcityAmsterdamen
dc.relation.ispartofdate2003
dc.relation.ispartofpages380en
dc.identifier.urlsitehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0733-558X(02)20010-5en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelSociologie économiqueen
dc.relation.ispartofisbn0-7623-1005-7en


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