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Interlocking judges : on joint exogenous and self-governance of markets

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Date
2003
Lien vers un document non conservé dans cette base
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0733-558X(02)20010-5
Indexation documentaire
Sociologie économique
Subject
Juges; Tribunal de commerce de Paris; Relations interorganisationnelles
Titre de l'ouvrage
he Governance of Relations in Markets and Organizations
Auteur
Snijders, Chris; Raub, Werner; Buskens, Vincent
Nom de l'éditeur
JAI
Ville de l'éditeur
Amsterdam
Année
2003
Nombre total de pages
380
ISBN
0-7623-1005-7
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/9062
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Auteur
Mounier, Lise
Lazega, Emmanuel
Type
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Nombre de pages du document
267-296
Résumé en anglais
This study stresses the importance of considering a “joint” governance of interfirm relations as an alternative to external governance (by the State) and self-governance (by the business community) of these relations. We argue that a broadly-conceived structural and organizational approach to economic institutions provides insights into this joint governance because it shows how such a system spreads the costs of control among several kinds of stakeholders. We look at how transactions between any two firms are regulated through jurisdiction by “consular” judges (i.e. judges elected through the local Chamber of Commerce) who indirectly represent other firms and industries in that market, and are therefore considered to be at the same time third parties and potential levers of influence acting on behalf of corporate interests. We study an empirical case of such joint governance: The Tribunal of Commerce of Paris (TCP). Following previous work on lateral control and leverage, we hypothesize that industries and/or companies that have a strong stake in the conflict resolution process will be more represented among the judges of this court than other industries and/or companies, and that judges who are socially active in the court that enforces this joint governance will be sought out for advice more than other judges, and thus gain influence on their peers by suggesting specific outcomes. The analyses of the composition of the bench and of the advice network data collected in this court display an influence structure that confirms these hypotheses and that is likely to affect conflict resolution between businesses. It thus characterizes joint governance of markets as a complex set of social processes worthy of economic sociologists’ attention.

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