Résumé en anglais

This study stresses the importance of considering a 'joint' form of regulation (and even "governance") of interfirm relations as an alternative to external regulation and a self-regulation of these relations. We argue that a broadly-conceived structural and organizational approach to economic institutions provides insights into this joint regulation because it shows how such a system spreads the costs of control among several kinds of stakeholders. We look at how transactions between any two firms are regulated through jurisdiction by 'consular' judges (i.e. elected mainly through the local Chamber of Commerce) who indirectly represent other firms and industries in that market - and are therefore considered to be at the same time third parties and potential levers of influence acting on behalf of corporate interests. We study an empirical case of such joint regulation : The Tribunal of Commerce of Paris (TCP). Following previous work on lateral control and leverage, we hypothesize that industries and/or companies that have a strong stake in the conflict resolution process will be more represented among the judges of this court than other industries and/or companies, and that judges who are socially active in the court will be sought out for advice more than other judges, and thus gain influence on their peers by suggesting specific outcomes. The analyses of the composition of the bench and of the advice network data collected in this court display an influence structure that confirms these hypotheses and that is likely to affect conflict resolution between businesses as well as bankruptcy proceedings. It thus characterizes joint regulation of markets as a complex set of social processes worthy of economic sociologists' attention.