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dc.contributor.authorBonnisseau, Jean-Marc
dc.contributor.authorIehlé, Vincent
dc.date.accessioned2009-03-27T16:05:15Z
dc.date.available2009-03-27T16:05:15Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/89
dc.descriptionLa version attaché à cette notice est la version soumise à publication.
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectBalancednessen
dc.subjectCooperative gameen
dc.subjectCoreen
dc.subjectParametrized gameen
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.classificationjelC60en
dc.subject.classificationjelC62en
dc.subject.classificationjelC71en
dc.subject.classificationjelD50en
dc.subject.classificationjelD51en
dc.titlePayoff-dependant Balancedness and Coresen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publiéen
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherUniversité Paris 1;France
dc.description.abstractenWe prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent balancedness, based on transfer rate mappings. We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff vectors satisfying this condition. The additional requirement of transfer rate equilibrium refines the core concept and allows the selection of specific core payoff vectors. Lastly, the class of parameterized cooperative games is introduced. This new setting and its associated equilibrium–core solution extend the usual cooperative game framework and core solution to situations depending on an exogenous environment. A non-emptiness result for the equilibrium–core is also provided in the context of a parametrized cooperative game. Our proofs borrow mathematical tools and geometric constructions from general equilibrium theory with non-convexities. Applications to extant results taken from game theory and economic theory are given.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameGames and Economic Behavior
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol61en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue1en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2007-10en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages1-26en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.002en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie politiqueen


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