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dc.contributor.authorde La Bruslerie, Hubert
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-27T14:12:55Z
dc.date.available2012-03-27T14:12:55Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/8598
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectPrivate benefitsen
dc.subjectcontrolen
dc.subjectdebt leverageen
dc.subjectasymmetry of informationen
dc.subjectcorporate governanceen
dc.subject.ddc658.1en
dc.subject.classificationjelG32en
dc.subject.classificationjelG30en
dc.subject.classificationjelG34en
dc.titleOwnership structure, debt, and private benefits in controlled firmsen
dc.typeCommunication / Conférence
dc.description.abstractenControlled firms are in a framework where private benefits create a buffer between public earnings and economic profitability. We focus on debt leverage in the type II agency conflict between the controlling shareholder and outside investors. We use a simple discrete model comparing the capital ownership stake of the controlling shareholder with that of the outside investors in a framework without and with debt. The paper highlights that debt is a governance variable, as it can moderate private benefits or, conversely, help diversion. Debt appears in some situations as a disciplinary tool in the conflict between outside and controlling shareholders. It may self-regulate the two parties involved in a control contract. The setting of joint ownership between the controlling shareholder and outside investors depends on the perceived level of private benefits. It has a connection with future earning management. The key terms of agreement between the two parties are the stakes of equity capital as wished by each one and the leverage ratio.en
dc.identifier.citationpages53en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelOrganisation et finances d'entrepriseen
dc.relation.conftitle10ème Conférence Internationale de Gouvernanceen
dc.relation.confdate2011-05
dc.relation.confcityMontréalen
dc.relation.confcountryFranceen


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