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Ownership structure, debt, and private benefits in controlled firms

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De la Bruslerie-Ownership Structure, Debt, and Private Bene.pdf (325.4Kb)
Date
2011
Dewey
Organisation et finances d'entreprise
Sujet
Private benefits; control; debt leverage; asymmetry of information; corporate governance
JEL code
G32; G30; G34
Conference name
10ème Conférence Internationale de Gouvernance
Conference date
05-2011
Conference city
Montréal
Conference country
France
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/8598
Collections
  • DRM : Publications
Metadata
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Author
de La Bruslerie, Hubert
Type
Communication / Conférence
Item number of pages
53
Abstract (EN)
Controlled firms are in a framework where private benefits create a buffer between public earnings and economic profitability. We focus on debt leverage in the type II agency conflict between the controlling shareholder and outside investors. We use a simple discrete model comparing the capital ownership stake of the controlling shareholder with that of the outside investors in a framework without and with debt. The paper highlights that debt is a governance variable, as it can moderate private benefits or, conversely, help diversion. Debt appears in some situations as a disciplinary tool in the conflict between outside and controlling shareholders. It may self-regulate the two parties involved in a control contract. The setting of joint ownership between the controlling shareholder and outside investors depends on the perceived level of private benefits. It has a connection with future earning management. The key terms of agreement between the two parties are the stakes of equity capital as wished by each one and the leverage ratio.

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