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dc.contributor.authorIehlé, Vincent
dc.date.accessioned2009-03-24T16:21:34Z
dc.date.available2009-03-24T16:21:34Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/84
dc.descriptionLa version attachée à cette notice est celle du working paper publié dans la série MPRA Paper n°13013.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectSubsidy Free Princingen
dc.subjectExistence Resulten
dc.subjectCooperative gameen
dc.subjectSustainabilityen
dc.subjectNatural monopolyen
dc.subject.ddc338en
dc.subject.classificationjelC71en
dc.subject.classificationjelL11en
dc.subject.classificationjelL12en
dc.titleSustainability in a Multiproduct and Multiple Agent Contestable Marketen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publiéen
dc.description.abstractenWe prove that a natural monopoly can set subsidy free pricing and sustainable pricing schedules in general economic environment. The setting is a multiproduct and multiple agent contestable market where demands are elastic and where rivals can enter the sub-markets composed by a set of the products line and a set of agents. Our results suggest that the existence results of the extant literature admit analogues even in an environment where rivals have enlarged possibilities to enter the market and where demands react to prices. The approach makes use of cooperative games to deduce the main results under conditions of fair sharing cost, threshold in the consumption and regularity of the profit function.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameBulletin of Economic research
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol61
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue2
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2009-04
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages151-164
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2009.00308.x
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherBlackwellen
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie Industrielleen


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