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dc.contributor.authorMarini, François
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-23T14:57:21Z
dc.date.available2012-02-23T14:57:21Z
dc.date.issued2008-07
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/8229
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectBanken
dc.subjectBankingen
dc.subjectBanking Crisisen
dc.subjectDepositen
dc.subjectDeposit Insuranceen
dc.subjectFinancial Intermediaryen
dc.subjectIntermediationen
dc.subjectRegulationen
dc.subject.ddc332en
dc.subject.classificationjelG28en
dc.subject.classificationjelG21en
dc.titleFinancial intermediation, monitoring, and liquidityen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenThis paper constructs a theoretical model that integrates the two objectives of capital adequacy requirements and deposit insurance, namely avoiding banking crises and protecting small depositors. The paper also addresses the related question : why do banks fund loans with both equity and demand deposits ? The model determines the optimal bank capital structure. In comparison with a Diamond-Dybvig bank which funds loans with demand deposits only, a capitalized financial intermediary provides liquidity to its depositors at a lower cost, and channels more funds to the most efficient investments. The model identifies the sources of market failure that may justify banking regulation.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameOxford Economic Papers
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol60en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue3en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2008-07
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages440–461en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpm041en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherOxford university pressen
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie financièreen


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