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dc.contributor.authorForges, Françoise
dc.contributor.authorVida, Péter
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-15T08:38:52Z
dc.date.available2012-02-15T08:38:52Z
dc.date.issued2013-01
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/8159
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectBayesian gameen
dc.subjectpre-play communicationen
dc.subjectcheap talken
dc.subjectcommunication equilibriumen
dc.subjectcorrelated equilibriumen
dc.subjectTwo Player
dc.subject.ddc338.5en
dc.subject.classificationjelC72en
dc.subject.classificationjelD70en
dc.subject.classificationjelC73
dc.titleImplementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk : the Two-Player Caseen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherUniversity of Vienna, Department of Economics;Autriche
dc.description.abstractenWe show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly fin nitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely fi nite), direct, cheap talk.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameTheoretical Economics
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol8
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue1
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2013-01
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages95-123
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.3982/TE944
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherSociety for Economic Theory
dc.subject.ddclabelMicroéconomieen


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