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Subsidizing low-skilled jobs in a dual labor market

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Date
2010-04
Dewey
Economie du travail
Sujet
Matching; Unemployment policy; Taxation
JEL code
H21; H23; J41; J68
Journal issue
Labour Economics
Volume
17
Publication date
04-2010
Article pages
776– 788
Publisher
Elsevier
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2010.04.003
Conference name
European Association of Labour Economists 21st annual conference
Conference date
09-2009
Conference city
Tallinn
Conference country
Estonie
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/8134
Collections
  • LEDa : Publications
Metadata
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Author
Belan, Pascal
Gregoir, Stéphane
Carré, Martine
Type
Communication / Conférence
Item number of pages
13
Abstract (EN)
We introduce a matching model that allows for classical and frictional unemployment. The labor market is dual featuring low-skilled and high-skilled workers and simple and complex jobs. Simple jobs pay a minimum wage, while wages in the complex jobs are determined by Nash bargaining. Opportunities for low-skilled workers are limited to simple jobs; while high-skilled unemployed can apply for both types of jobs, and thereby can accept to be downgraded. We analyze the outcomes of simple job subsidy policies assuming that government budget is balanced thr ough taxes on occupied workers. We fi rst give conditi ons for the existence and uniqueness of a steady-state equilibrium and we then analyze the effects of different fiscal instruments. We show that in this set-up, increasing simple job sub sidies does not necessarily reduce low-skilled unemployment or unemployment spells. By introducing heterogeneous skills and possible down-grading of the high-skilled workers, we show that the effectiveness of such policies in reducing the classical unemployment is decreasing. In fact, any additional classical unemployed re-entering the job market is accompanied by an increasing number of high-skilled workers downgrading to low-skilled jobs. We calibrate the model on French labor market data. It is found that for five low-skilled workers leav ing classical unemployment, two high-skilled workers are downgraded.

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