Abstract (EN)

The goodwill is, by nature, complex since this notion encompasses two realities: the first is an economic concept – the expected present value of economic profits – the second is an accounting aggregate – the excess of the acquirer’s purchase price over the fair values of the target’s net assets. As these two concepts overlap, we clarify these notions by disaggregating the accounting goodwill between overpayment, internally generated goodwill (IGG) and external synergies. Our contribution relates to both the valuation of economic goodwill and the analysis of accounting goodwill. With regard to the first subject, we propose a new method to explain the creation and measure the value of IGG. The method is based on the idea that firm value is affected by interactions between assets used in combination to conduct business. Based on Choquet (1953) capacities, i.e. non-additive aggregation operators, we explain the creation of IGG, and demonstrate from a sample of U.S. listed firms that this model over-performs the traditional additive Ohlson (1995)-type model on accuracy in forecasting enterprise value. Regarding the second subject, we examine the effects on the equity cost of capital implied by goodwill impairment disclosures. We document a negative association between the relevant information disclosed and commitment to transparency, and the cost of capital. We also investigate the economic consequences of purchase price allocation disclosures (IFRS 3, FAS 141) on bid-ask spreads as well as on cumulated abnormal returns. We provide evidence that firms disclosing more about purchase price allocation reduce their bid-ask spread and investors’ valuation errors.