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dc.contributor.authorOrzach, Ram
dc.contributor.authorForges, Françoise
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-18T14:36:49Z
dc.date.available2012-01-18T14:36:49Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/7891
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectCharacteristic functionen
dc.subjectPartition form gameen
dc.subjectCoreen
dc.subjectCollusionen
dc.subjectBayesian gameen
dc.subjectAuctionsen
dc.subject.ddc519en
dc.subject.classificationjelD44en
dc.subject.classificationjelC72en
dc.subject.classificationjelC71en
dc.titleCore-stable rings in second price auctions with common valuesen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherDept of Economics, Oakland University Oakland University;États-Unis
dc.description.abstractenIn a commonvalueauction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy et al. [Einy, E., Haimanko, O., Orzach, R., Sela, A., 2002. Dominance solvability of second-pricesauctions with differential information. Journal of Mathematical Economics 37, 247–258], describe a cooperative games in characteristic function form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function is not empty. Furthermore, every ring can implement its sophisticated equilibrium strategy by means of an incentive compatible mechanism. An example shows that, if the bidders’ information partitions are not connected, rings may no longer be core-stable.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameJournal of Mathematical Economics
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol47en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue6en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2011
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages760-767en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.10.006en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelProbabilités et mathématiques appliquéesen


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