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Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

Renault, Jérôme (2012), Repeated Games with Incomplete Information, in Meyers, Robert A., Computational Complexity. Theory, Techniques, and Applications, Springer : Berlin, p. 2635-2655. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1800-9_162

Type
Chapitre d'ouvrage
Date
2012
Book title
Computational Complexity. Theory, Techniques, and Applications
Book author
Meyers, Robert A.
Publisher
Springer
Published in
Berlin
ISBN
978-1-4614-1799-6
Number of pages
3492
Pages
2635-2655
Publication identifier
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1800-9_162
Metadata
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Author(s)
Renault, Jérôme
Subjects / Keywords
Incomplete information; Repeated games
JEL
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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