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Ideology and endogenous constitutions

Riboni, Alessandro (2013), Ideology and endogenous constitutions, Economic Theory, 52, 3, p. 885-913. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0668-9

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IDEOLOGYSUM.pdf (625.3Kb)
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2013
Journal name
Economic Theory
Volume
52
Number
3
Publisher
Springer
Pages
885-913
Publication identifier
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0668-9
Metadata
Show full item record
Author(s)
Riboni, Alessandro
Abstract (EN)
We study a legislature where decisions are made by playing an agenda-setting game. Legislators are concerned about their electoral prospects but they are also genuinely concerned for the legislature to make the correct decision. We show that when ideological polarization is positive but not too large (and the status quo is extremely inefficient), institutions in which the executive has either no constraints (autocracy) or many constraints (unanimity) are preferable to democracies that operate under an intermediate number of constraints (simple majority rule). When instead ideological polarization is large (and the status quo is only moderately inefficient), simple majority turns out to be preferable.
Subjects / Keywords
Majority rule; Position-taking preferences; Ideological polarization; Strategic interactions; Agenda-setting game
JEL
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact

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