Abstract (EN)

Conflicts are likely less violent if individuals entertain the possibility that the opponent may be right. Why is it so difficult to observe this attitude? To answer this question, this paper studies information transmission from an informed principal (the parent) to a naive agent (the son). After being informed, the agent participates in a game of con ict. The parent wants to motivate his son to exert effort in the conflict, but he also cares that the son has the right incentives to acquire information and that he selects the correct policy. Finally, to study cultural transmission over time we consider a two-period OG economy where the son becomes a parent when he is old. Under some conditions dogmatic attitudes are observed : individuals never doubt, conflicts are violent and bad decisions are made. We also argue that societies may find it difficult to abandon dogmatic attitudes over time. Under some other conditions, skeptical attitudes of systematic doubt are instead observed. However, we argue that in the long-run parents may stop inducing skeptical attitudes: societies where individuals systematically doubt are likely to switch to fact-based attitudes.