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dc.contributor.authorRiboni, Alessandro
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-29T15:05:56Z
dc.date.available2011-11-29T15:05:56Z
dc.date.issued2010-02
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/7684
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectTime Consistency Problemsen
dc.subjectDynamic votingen
dc.subjectCommitteesen
dc.subject.ddc339en
dc.subject.classificationjelD72en
dc.subject.classificationjelE61en
dc.subject.classificationjelE58en
dc.titleCommittees as Substitutes for Commitmenten
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenIn this article, policies are negotiated in a committee by playing a dynamic voting game with an endogenous default (or status quo) policy. I show that joining a committee by maintaining a strong agenda setting power is a way for a decision maker to commit to a policy that in absence of committees is not time consistent. The disciplinary role of the endogenous status quo and the heterogeneity of preferences within the committee are two crucial ingredients to obtain this result. As a motivating example, this article focuses on the time consistency of monetary policy.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameInternational Economic Review
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol51en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue1en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2010-02
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages213-236en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00577.xen
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherWileyen
dc.subject.ddclabelMacroéconomieen


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