
Committees as Substitutes for Commitment
Riboni, Alessandro (2010), Committees as Substitutes for Commitment, International Economic Review, 51, 1, p. 213-236. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00577.x
View/ Open
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publiéDate
2010-02Journal name
International Economic ReviewVolume
51Number
1Publisher
Wiley
Pages
213-236
Publication identifier
Metadata
Show full item recordAuthor(s)
Riboni, AlessandroAbstract (EN)
In this article, policies are negotiated in a committee by playing a dynamic voting game with an endogenous default (or status quo) policy. I show that joining a committee by maintaining a strong agenda setting power is a way for a decision maker to commit to a policy that in absence of committees is not time consistent. The disciplinary role of the endogenous status quo and the heterogeneity of preferences within the committee are two crucial ingredients to obtain this result. As a motivating example, this article focuses on the time consistency of monetary policy.Subjects / Keywords
Time Consistency Problems; Dynamic voting; CommitteesRelated items
Showing items related by title and author.
-
Riboni, Alessandro; Ruge-Murcia, Francesco (2008-08) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
-
Riboni, Alessandro; Ruge-Murcia, Francesco (2008) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
-
Riboni, Alessandro; Ruge-Murcia, Francesco (2010-02) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
-
Gordon, Sidartha; Riboni, Alessandro (2015) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
-
Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo; Riboni, Alessandro (2010-05) Document de travail / Working paper