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dc.contributor.authorRenou, Ludovic
dc.contributor.authorCarlier, Guillaume
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-14T09:43:54Z
dc.date.available2011-11-14T09:43:54Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/7447
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectDebt contractsen
dc.subjectDiversity of opinionsen
dc.subjectScreeningen
dc.subjectCostly monitoringen
dc.subjectPoolingen
dc.subject.ddc332en
dc.subject.classificationjelC7en
dc.subject.classificationjelD8en
dc.subject.classificationjelG3en
dc.titleDebt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an exampleen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenWe consider a simple model of lending and borrowing combining two informational problems: adverse selection and costly state verification. Our analysis highlights the interaction between these two informational problems. We notably show that the higher the monitoring cost, the less discriminating the optimal menu of contracts is.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameEconomic Theory
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol28en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue2en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2006
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages461-473en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0632-7en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherSpringeren
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie financièreen


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