Résumé en anglais

The Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) market is a new market, which relies on extra-financial criteria. “Extra-financial” means it aims at selecting assets also on social or environmental criteria. As a consequence, it gathers very heterogeneous actors like financial actors, extra-financial rating agencies and NGOs. Given the uncertainties regarding its future development, these actors have to collaborate. We use an exponential random graph model (ERGM) to highlight the process, which underlies the formation of co-work ties in the market. Different effects are studied : the endogenous effects of the social structure, the effects of the different visions about SRI, the effects of perceived prestige, the effects of market entry date and the effects of functional interdependences. First, the structural effects confirm the existence of bounded solidarity among these actors. Second, the different visions about SRI do not shape the formation of cliques. Third, the status hierarchy intervenes in the process of coalition formation and leads to a polarization of the market. Fourth, incumbents, mainly rating agencies, and challengers, the financial actors, use opposite collaboration strategies to strengthen their positions. Whereas incumbents adopt a narrow and self-protective strategy, challengers apply an extensive collaboration strategy. Fifth, the entry date confers an advantage to market pioneers, since they best know actors and may then more easily create partnerships.