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dc.contributor.authorDominiak, Adam
dc.contributor.authorLefort, Jean-Philippe
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-25T13:22:16Z
dc.date.available2011-10-25T13:22:16Z
dc.date.issued2011-04
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/7323
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectChoquet expected utilityen
dc.subjectUnambiguous eventsen
dc.subjectFiltrationen
dc.subjectUpdatingen
dc.subjectDynamic consistencyen
dc.subjectConsequentialismen
dc.subject.ddc338.5en
dc.subject.classificationjelD81en
dc.subject.classificationjelD82en
dc.titleUnambiguous events and dynamic Choquet preferencesen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherDepartment of Economics, University of Heidelberg;Allemagne
dc.description.abstractenThis paper explores the relationship between dynamic consistency and existing notions of unambiguous events for Choquet expected utility preferences. A decision maker is faced with an information structure represented by a filtration. We show that the decision maker’s preferences respect dynamic consistency on a fixed filtration if and only if the last stage of the filtration is composed of unambiguous events in the sense of Nehring (Math Social Sci 38:197–213, 1999). Adopting two axioms, conditional certainty equivalence consistency and constrained dynamic consistency to filtration measurable acts, it is shown that the decision maker respects these two axioms on a fixed filtration if and only if the last stage of the filtration is made up of unambiguous events in the sense of Zhang (Econ Theory 20:159–181, 2002).en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameEconomic theory
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol46en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue3en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2011-04
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages401-425en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0512-7en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherSpringeren
dc.subject.ddclabelMicroéconomieen


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