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Bargaining on law and bureaucracies: A constitutional theory of development

Sgard, Jérôme; Schemeil, Yves; Brousseau, Eric (2010), Bargaining on law and bureaucracies: A constitutional theory of development, Journal of comparative economics, 38, 3, p. 253-266. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2010.07.004

Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2010
Journal name
Journal of comparative economics
Volume
38
Number
3
Publisher
Elsevier Inc.
Pages
253-266
Publication identifier
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2010.07.004
Metadata
Show full item record
Author(s)
Sgard, Jérôme
Schemeil, Yves
Brousseau, Eric
Abstract (EN)
The process of development is linked to the rise of an integrated and competitive economy and polity that allow a maximal division of labor and innovation. This process relies on two intertwined dynamics. First, in the establishment of the rule of law, legal instruments are appropriated by those who call for more autonomy, resulting in a progressive equalization of rights. Second, development of a capable and impartial state is a prerequisite to implementation of rights, including their translation into services delivered to citizens. The mutual expansion of these dynamics relies on a vertical negotiation between the elite and the governed. The governed call for rights that are more firmly established and more extended. The ruling elite can grant these rights to maintain its legitimacy and hence its recognized authority. This model allows discussing the sustainability of various paths of institutional change in processes of development by identifying the potential virtuous dynamics and hindering factors.
Subjects / Keywords
Institutions and development; Rule of law; Public bureaucracy; State; Constitution; Federalism; Rulers vs. governed; Legal bargaining; Delegation of authority
JEL
O43 - Institutions and Growth
K00 - General
H40 - General
D70 - General
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact

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