Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorBrousseau, Eric
dc.contributor.authorGarrouste, Pierre
dc.contributor.authorRaynaud, Emmanuel
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-03T08:17:15Z
dc.date.available2011-10-03T08:17:15Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/7073
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectRulesen
dc.subjectSelf-enforcing equilibriumen
dc.subjectHuman rationalityen
dc.subjectSelection processesen
dc.subjectPolitical economyen
dc.subjectInstitutional reformsen
dc.subjectBelief
dc.subjectEquilibria
dc.subjectEquilibrium
dc.subjectInstitution
dc.subjectInstitutional Design
dc.subjectRationality
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.classificationjelP36en
dc.subject.classificationjelO43en
dc.subject.classificationjelH1en
dc.subject.classificationjelE02en
dc.subject.classificationjelD02en
dc.subject.classificationjelB52en
dc.subject.classificationjelD83
dc.subject.classificationjelZ13
dc.titleInstitutional changes: Alternative theories and consequences for institutional designen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherUniversity of Paris I;France
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherUniversité Paris Ouest;France
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherUniversité de Nice Sophia-Antipolis;France
dc.description.abstractenThis paper surveys alternative approaches to the emergence and evolution of institutions. The challenge is to develop frameworks capable of capturing both stability and change. We follow a “descaling” approach to show how founding assumptions about economics—namely, alternative assumptions about individual rationality and the role of social efficiency—influence our understanding of the drivers of institutional evolution. We then contrast two families of institutional theory. In the first, institutions are viewed as rules imposed on individuals and the focus is on the strategic games among coalitions that aim to promote or block new rules. In the second, institutions are viewed as shared beliefs; here the idea is to analyze how equilibria that are self-enforcing (in terms of mutual expectations about others’ behaviors) can collapse and so induce switching to another equilibrium. Finally, we discuss the political economy literature that examines institutional transitions to a market economy, and we identify long-term drivers as well as short-term political barriers to institutional reforms.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol79en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue1-2en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2011-06
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages3-19en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.01.024en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevier B.V.en
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie politiqueen


Files in this item

FilesSizeFormatView

There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record