Afficher la notice abrégée

dc.contributor.authorXia, Lirong
dc.contributor.authorConitzer, Vincent
dc.contributor.authorLang, Jérôme
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-01T12:20:20Z
dc.date.available2011-10-01T12:20:20Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/7069
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectpreferences
dc.subjectvoting
dc.subject.ddc006.3en
dc.titleStrategic Sequential Voting in Multi-Issue Domains and Multiple-Election Paradoxes
dc.typeCommunication / Conférence
dc.description.abstractenIn many settings, a group of agents must come to a joint decision on multipleissues. In practice, this is often done by voting on the issues in sequence. In this paper, we model sequential voting in multi-issue domains as a complete-informationextensive-form game, in which the agents are perfectly rational and their preferences are common knowledge. In each step, the voters simultaneously vote on oneissue, and the order of the issues is determined before the process. We call thismodel strategic sequential voting.We focus on domains with binary issues, so that this process leads to a uniqueoutcome under a natural solution concept. We show several multiple-election paradoxes in strategic sequential voting: there exists a profile for which the winnerunder strategic sequential voting is ranked nearly at the bottom in all votes, and thewinner is Pareto-dominated by almost every other alternative. We also show thatchanging the order of the issues cannot completely prevent such paradoxes. Wealso study paradoxes for strategic sequential voting in which the profiles satisfy domain restrictions such as separability, lexicographicity or O -legality. Finally, westudy other common voting rules (from a non-strategic perspective). For some ofthem, we show that there exist paradoxes that are similar to the multiple-electionparadoxes, and for the others, we show that there are no such paradoxes.
dc.identifier.citationpages179-188
dc.relation.ispartoftitleProceedings 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2011), San Jose, CA, USA, June 5-9, 2011
dc.relation.ispartofeditorShoham, Yohav
dc.relation.ispartofpublnameACM
dc.relation.ispartofdate2011
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelIntelligence artificielleen
dc.relation.ispartofisbn978-1-4503-0261-6
dc.relation.confcountryUNITED STATES
dc.description.ssrncandidatenon
dc.description.halcandidateoui
dc.description.readershiprecherche
dc.description.audienceInternational
dc.date.updated2017-01-06T18:05:06Z


Fichiers attachés à cette notice

Thumbnail

Ce document fait partie de la (des) collection(s) suivante(s)

Afficher la notice abrégée