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dc.contributor.authorGossner, Olivier
dc.contributor.authorTomala, Tristan
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-29T15:04:03Z
dc.date.available2011-08-29T15:04:03Z
dc.date.issued2003
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6885
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectcorrelationen
dc.subjectoptimization problemen
dc.subjectmin-max valuesen
dc.subjectrepeated gamesen
dc.subject.ddc519en
dc.subject.classificationjelC61en
dc.titleEntropy and codification in repeated games with imperfect monitoringen
dc.typeDocument de travail / Working paper
dc.description.abstractenWe characterize the minmax values of a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal trade-off for the team formed by punishing players between optimization of stage-payoffs and generation of signals for future correlation. Amounts of correlation are measured through the entropy function. Our theorem on minmax values stems from a more general characterization of optimal strategies for a class of optimization problems.en
dc.publisher.nameUniversité Paris-Dauphineen
dc.publisher.cityParisen
dc.identifier.citationpages22en
dc.relation.ispartofseriestitleCahiers du Ceremadeen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesnumber9en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelProbabilités et mathématiques appliquéesen


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