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Probabilistic Reliability and Privacy of Communication Using Multicast in General Neighbor Networks

Renault, Jérôme; Tomala, Tristan (2008), Probabilistic Reliability and Privacy of Communication Using Multicast in General Neighbor Networks, Journal of Cryptology, 21, 2, p. 250-279. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00145-007-9018-2

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Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2008
Journal name
Journal of Cryptology
Volume
21
Number
2
Publisher
Springer
Pages
250-279
Publication identifier
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00145-007-9018-2
Metadata
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Author(s)
Renault, Jérôme
Tomala, Tristan
Abstract (EN)
This paper studies reliability and security of information transmission in networks. We consider the framework of Franklin and Wright (J. Cryptol. 13(1):9–30, 2000): multicast communication and byzantine adversary. Franklin and Wright studied particular neighbor graphs with neighbor-disjoint paths. The aim of the present work is to drop this assumption and to give necessary and sufficient conditions on the neighbor graph allowing reliable and secure information transmission.
Subjects / Keywords
Communication networks; Graphs; Security; Multicast; Repeated games; Incomplete information

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