Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

dc.contributor.author	Gossner, Olivier
dc.contributor.author	Tomala, Tristan
dc.date.accessioned	2011-07-27T14:58:24Z
dc.date.available	2011-07-27T14:58:24Z
dc.date.issued	2007
dc.identifier.uri	https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6817
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.subject	stochastic process	en
dc.subject	min–max values	en
dc.subject	signals	en
dc.subject	entropy	en
dc.subject	repeated games	en
dc.subject	secret correlation	en
dc.subject.ddc	519	en
dc.title	Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring	en
dc.type	Article accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstracten	We characterize the maximum payoff that a team can guarantee against another in a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal tradeoff for the team between optimization of stage payoffs and generation of signals for future correlation.	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlname	Mathematics of Operations Research
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol	32	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue	2	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate	2007
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages	413-424	en
dc.relation.isversionofdoi	http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.1060.0248	en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivate	oui	en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisher	Informs	en
dc.subject.ddclabel	Probabilités et mathématiques appliquées	en

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