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Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

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Date
2007
Dewey
Probabilités et mathématiques appliquées
Sujet
stochastic process; min–max values; signals; entropy; repeated games; secret correlation
Journal issue
Mathematics of Operations Research
Volume
32
Number
2
Publication date
2007
Article pages
413-424
Publisher
Informs
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.1060.0248
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6817
Collections
  • CEREMADE : Publications
Metadata
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Author
Gossner, Olivier
Tomala, Tristan
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
We characterize the maximum payoff that a team can guarantee against another in a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal tradeoff for the team between optimization of stage payoffs and generation of signals for future correlation.

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