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3-player repeated games with lack of information on one side

Renault, Jérôme (2001), 3-player repeated games with lack of information on one side, International Journal of Game Theory, 30, 2, p. 221-245. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001820100076

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Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2001
Journal name
International Journal of Game Theory
Volume
30
Number
2
Publisher
Springer
Pages
221-245
Publication identifier
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Author(s)
Renault, Jérôme
Abstract (EN)
We study the existence of uniform equilibria for three-player repeated games with lack of information on one side and perfect observation. If there are only two states of nature, a completely revealing or a joint plan equilibrium always exists. This is not the case for larger spaces of states.
Subjects / Keywords
repeated games; incomplete information; lack of information on one side; 3 players; uniform equilibrium; existence of equilibria
JEL
D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design