3-player repeated games with lack of information on one side

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Date
2001
Dewey
Probabilités et mathématiques appliquées
Sujet
repeated games; incomplete information; lack of information on one side; 3 players; uniform equilibrium; existence of equilibria
JEL code
D5; C7; D82
Journal issue
International Journal of Game Theory
Volume
30
Number
2
Publication date
2001
Article pages
221-245
Publisher
Springer
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001820100076
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6538
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Author
Renault, Jérôme
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
We study the existence of uniform equilibria for three-player repeated games with lack of information on one side and perfect observation. If there are only two states of nature, a completely revealing or a joint plan equilibrium always exists. This is not the case for larger spaces of states.