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dc.contributor.authorBien, Franck
dc.contributor.authorAlary, David
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-15T13:55:40Z
dc.date.available2011-06-15T13:55:40Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6505
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectMoral hazarden
dc.subjectHealth insuranceen
dc.subjectbivariate utility functionen
dc.subjecthealth statusen
dc.subjectoptimal contracten
dc.subject.ddc334en
dc.subject.classificationjelI19en
dc.subject.classificationjelG22en
dc.subject.classificationjelD82en
dc.titleOptimal health insurance contract : can moral hazard increase indemnity ?en
dc.typeCommunication / Conférence
dc.description.abstractenIn this note, we generalize the results obtained by Barday and Lesur (2005) by considering a bivariated non separable utility function. We characterize optimal health insurance contracts. Moreover, we show that under moral hazard a sufficiently high risk aversion implies that the optimal coverage and the optimal preventive effort are higher than with perfect information.en
dc.identifier.citationpages6en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie socialeen
dc.relation.conftitle33th Seminar of the European Group of Risk and Insurance Economicsen
dc.relation.confdate2006-09
dc.relation.confcityBarceloneen
dc.relation.confcountryEspagneen


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