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Adverse selection and moral hazard in health insurance

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870BE97Ed01.pdf (118.2Kb)
Date
2006-11
Notes
Assurance-maladie; Assurance; Polices; Contrats
Dewey
Economie sociale
Sujet
Health insurance; risk; policyholders
JEL code
D81; G22; I11
Conference name
56ème Congrès annuel de l’AFSE
Conference date
09-2006
Conference city
Paris
Conference country
France
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6467
Collections
  • LEDa : Publications
Metadata
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Author
Bien, Franck
Alary, David
Type
Communication / Conférence
Item number of pages
10
Abstract (EN)
In this paper, we want to characterize the optimal health insurance contract with adverse selection and moral hazard. We assume that policyholders differ by the permanent health status loss and choose an unobservable preventive effort in order to reduce the probability of illness which is ex-ante identical. The difference in illness'after-effect modifies policyholders' preventive actions. By the way, they differ in probabilities of illness leading to a situation close to Rothschild and Stiglitz 'model. In this case, we show that the optimal contract exhibits a deductible for the high health risk type since a higher after effect implies a higher preventive effort and then a lower probability of illness rather than for the low health risk type.

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