Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorGollier, Christian
dc.contributor.authorAlary, David
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-08T14:38:17Z
dc.date.available2011-06-08T14:38:17Z
dc.date.issued2004-11
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6457
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectStrategic defaulten
dc.subjectImperfect auditen
dc.subjectFineen
dc.subjectConsumer crediten
dc.subject.ddc332en
dc.subject.classificationjelG21en
dc.subject.classificationjelD82en
dc.subject.classificationjelD18en
dc.titleDebt Contract, Strategic Default, and Optimal Penalties with Judgement Errorsen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.contributor.editoruniversityotherUniversité de Toulouse;France
dc.description.abstractenWe characterize the competitive equilibrium on the credit market when borrowers can strategically default. We assume that the audit is subject of errors of the two types and that lenders cannot commit ex-ante. We determine the penalty, the loan rate, the audit and strategic default probabilities. Borrowers' limited liability is endogenous when \judicial errors" exist, strategic default appears at equilibrium depending on the borrowers' absolute risk aversion. We show that at equilibrium loan contracts exhibit a penalty such that borrowers never strategically default. This is true with IARA and CARA utility function. Finally, we show that with DARA, strategic default may exist.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameAnnals of Economics and Finance
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol5en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue2en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2004-11
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages357-372en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherPeking University Pressen
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie financièreen


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record