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Private Valuation of a Public Good in Three Auction Mechanisms

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Date
2011
Dewey
Economie financière
Sujet
auction mechanisms; WTP-WTA disparity; private provisions; public goods
JEL code
Q53; C91; D44
Journal issue
Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis
Volume
2
Number
2
Publication date
2011
Article pages
art. 4
Publisher
Berkeley Electronic Press
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/2152-2812.1064
URI
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6445
Collections
  • LEDa : Publications
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Author
Dragicevic, Arnaud
Ettinger, David
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Abstract (EN)
We evaluate the impact of three auction mechanisms – the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) mechanism, the second-price auction (SPA), and the random nth-price auction (NPA) – in the measurement of private willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept for a pure public good. Our results show that the endowment effect is lower with the BDM mechanism. In this market mechanism, the effect disappears after a few repetitions. Yet, on a logarithmic scale, the random nth-price auction yields the highest speed of convergence towards equality of welfare indices. We also observe that subjects value public goods in reference to their private subjective benefit derived from their public good funding.

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