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dc.contributor.authorGossner, Olivier
dc.contributor.authorVieille, Nicolas
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-31T15:00:36Z
dc.date.available2011-05-31T15:00:36Z
dc.date.issued2003
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6379
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectPublic value of informationen
dc.subjectGames with incomplete informationen
dc.subjectBandit problemsen
dc.subject.ddc519en
dc.subject.classificationjelC72en
dc.titleStrategic learning in games with symmetric informationen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenThis article studies situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions, but learn from experience the payoffs induced by their choices and their opponents'. We chararacterize equilibrium payoffs in terms of simple strategies in which an exploration phase is followed by a payoff acquisition phase.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameGames and Economic Behavior
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol42en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue1en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2003
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages25-47en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00535-3en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelProbabilités et mathématiques appliquéesen


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