The value of repeated games with an informed controller

dc.contributor.author	Renault, Jérôme HAL ID: 21086
dc.date.accessioned	2011-05-10T08:32:03Z
dc.date.available	2011-05-10T08:32:03Z
dc.date.issued	2009
dc.identifier.uri	https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6248
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.subject	Wasserstein distance	en
dc.subject	Choquet order	en
dc.subject	single controller	en
dc.subject	Repeated games	en
dc.subject	uniform value	en
dc.subject	incomplete information	en
dc.subject	stochastic games	en
dc.subject.ddc	519	en
dc.subject.classificationjel	C73	en
dc.subject.classificationjel	D81	en
dc.title	The value of repeated games with an informed controller	en
dc.type	Communication / Conférence	en
dc.description.abstracten	We consider the general model of zero-sum repeated games (or stochastic games with signals), and assume that one of the players is fully informed and controls the transitions of the state variable. We prove the existence of the uniform value, generalizing several results of the literature. A preliminary existence result is obtained for a certain class of stochastic games played with pure strategies.	en
dc.identifier.citationpages	35	en
dc.identifier.urlsite	http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00266378/fr/	en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivate	oui	en
dc.subject.ddclabel	Probabilités et mathématiques appliquées	en
dc.relation.conftitle	3rd World Congress of the Game Theory Society (GAMES 2008)
dc.relation.confdate	2008-07
dc.relation.confcity	Evanston (Il)
dc.relation.confcountry	Etats-Unis

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