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dc.contributor.authorCarlier, Guillaume
dc.contributor.authorGaumont, Damien
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-10T08:19:35Z
dc.date.available2011-05-10T08:19:35Z
dc.date.issued2000
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6245
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectAdverse Selectionen
dc.subjectIncentive-Compatible Contractsen
dc.subjectIroning Procedureen
dc.subjectHeterogeneous Time Preferenceen
dc.subject.ddc332en
dc.subject.classificationjelC61en
dc.subject.classificationjelC62en
dc.subject.classificationjelD82en
dc.subject.classificationjelJ31en
dc.titleLabor Contracts With Two-Dimensional Adverse Selectionen
dc.typeDocument de travail / Working paper
dc.description.abstractenWe study incentive-compatible labor contracts in the case where both individual productivity and subjective discount rate are unobservable by the rm. We rst show that unidimensional manifolds of agents group on the same contract. High , low agents may choose the same contract as low , high agents. We show existence and uniqueness of an optimal wage function which is continuous and unbounded. This optimal wage function can be determined by the ironing procedure.en
dc.publisher.nameUniversité Paris-Dauphineen
dc.publisher.cityParisen
dc.identifier.citationpages20en
dc.relation.ispartofseriestitleCahiers du CEREMADEen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesnumber2000-22en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie financièreen


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