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dc.contributor.authorGossner, Olivier
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-10T08:04:42Z
dc.date.available2011-05-10T08:04:42Z
dc.date.issued1998
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6244
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectcommunicationen
dc.subjectinformationen
dc.subjectequilibriaen
dc.subject.ddc519en
dc.subject.classificationjelC72en
dc.titleSecure Protocols or How Communication Generates Correlationen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenCorrelated equilibria and communication equilibria are useful notions to understand the strategic effects of information and communication. Between these two models, a protocol generates information through communication. We define a secure protocol as a protocol from which no individual may have strategic incentives to deviate and characterize these protocols.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameJournal of Economic Theory
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol83en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue1en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate1998
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages69-89en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2444en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelProbabilités et mathématiques appliquéesen


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