Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorRenault, Jérôme
dc.contributor.authorScarlatti, Sergio
dc.contributor.authorScarsini, Marco
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-09T10:25:16Z
dc.date.available2011-05-09T10:25:16Z
dc.date.issued2005
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6223
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectRepeated gamesen
dc.subjectImperfect monitoringen
dc.subjectPublic signalsen
dc.subject.ddc332en
dc.subject.classificationjelC72en
dc.titleA folk theorem for minority gamesen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenWe study a particular case of repeated games with public signals. In the stage game an odd number of players have to choose simultaneously one of two rooms. The players who choose the less crowded room receive a reward of one euro (whence the name “minority game”). The players in the same room do not recognize each other, and between the stages only the current majority room is publicly announced. We show that in the infinitely repeated game any feasible payoff can be achieved as a uniform equilibrium payoff, and as an almost sure equilibrium payoff. In particular we construct an inefficient equilibrium where, with probability one, all players choose the same room at almost all stages. This equilibrium is sustained by punishment phases which use, in an unusual way, the pure actions that were played before the start of the punishment.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameGames and Economic Behavior
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol53en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue2en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2005
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages208-230en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.013en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie financièreen


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record