• xmlui.mirage2.page-structure.header.title
    • français
    • English
  • Help
  • Login
  • Language 
    • Français
    • English
View Item 
  •   BIRD Home
  • CEREMADE (UMR CNRS 7534)
  • CEREMADE : Publications
  • View Item
  •   BIRD Home
  • CEREMADE (UMR CNRS 7534)
  • CEREMADE : Publications
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Browse

BIRDResearch centres & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesTypeThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesType

My Account

LoginRegister

Statistics

Most Popular ItemsStatistics by CountryMost Popular Authors
Thumbnail

Playing off-line games with bounded rationality

Scarsini, Marco; Renault, Jérôme; Tomala, Tristan (2008), Playing off-line games with bounded rationality, Mathematical Social Sciences, 56, 2, p. 207-223. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.01.005

View/Open
2007-10.pdf (209.8Kb)
Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2008
Journal name
Mathematical Social Sciences
Volume
56
Number
2
Publisher
Elsevier
Pages
207-223
Publication identifier
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.01.005
Metadata
Show full item record
Author(s)
Scarsini, Marco
Renault, Jérôme
Tomala, Tristan
Abstract (EN)
We study a two-person zero-sum game where players simultaneously choose sequences of actions, and the overall payoff is the average of a one-shot payoff over the joint sequence. We consider the maxmin value of the game played in pure strategies by boundedly rational players and model bounded rationality by introducing complexity limitations. First we define the complexity of a sequence by its smallest period (a nonperiodic sequence being of infinite complexity) and study the maxmin of the game where player 1 is restricted to strategies with complexity at most n and player 2 is restricted to strategies with complexity at most m. We study the asymptotics of this value and a complete characterization in the matching pennies case. We extend the analysis of matching pennies to strategies with bounded recall.
Subjects / Keywords
primary; Games/group decisions; Noncooperative
JEL
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
C72 - Noncooperative Games

Related items

Showing items related by title and author.

  • Thumbnail
    A minority game with bounded recall 
    Renault, Jérôme; Scarsini, Marco; Tomala, Tristan (2007) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
  • Thumbnail
    Discounted and Finitely Repeated Minority Games with Public Signals 
    Scarlatti, Sergio; Scarsini, Marco; Renault, Jérôme (2008) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
  • Thumbnail
    Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals 
    Renault, Jérôme; Tomala, Tristan (2004) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
  • Thumbnail
    Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring 
    Renault, Jérôme; Tomala, Tristan (2004) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
  • Thumbnail
    A folk theorem for minority games 
    Renault, Jérôme; Scarlatti, Sergio; Scarsini, Marco (2005) Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Dauphine PSL Bibliothèque logo
Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny 75775 Paris Cedex 16
Phone: 01 44 05 40 94
Contact
Dauphine PSL logoEQUIS logoCreative Commons logo