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Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals

dc.contributor.authorRenault, Jérôme
HAL ID: 21086
dc.contributor.authorTomala, Tristan
dc.date.accessioned2011-04-29T14:03:49Z
dc.date.available2011-04-29T14:03:49Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.identifier.urihttps://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6115
dc.language.isoenen
dc.subjectIncomplete informationen
dc.subjectRepeated gamesen
dc.subjectImperfect monitoringen
dc.subjectCompletely revealing equilibriaen
dc.subjectCommunicationen
dc.subjectByzantine agreementen
dc.subject.ddc332en
dc.subject.classificationjelC72en
dc.subject.classificationjelC73en
dc.subject.classificationjelD82en
dc.subject.classificationjelD83en
dc.titleLearning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signalsen
dc.typeArticle accepté pour publication ou publié
dc.description.abstractenThe motivation of this paper comes from repeated games with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. It concerns the existence, for any payoff function, of a particular equilibrium (called completely revealing) allowing each player to learn the state of nature. We consider thus an interaction in which players, facing some incomplete information about the state of nature, exchange messages while imperfectly monitoring them. We then ask the question: can players learn the true state even under unilateral deviations? This problem is indeed closely related to Byzantine agreement problems from computer science. We define two different notions describing what a player can learn if at most one other player is faulty. We first link these notions with existence of completely revealing equilibria, then we characterize them for monitoring structures given by a graph. As a corollary we obtain existence of equilibria for a class of undiscounted repeated games.en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlnameGames and Economic Behavior
dc.relation.isversionofjnlvol47en
dc.relation.isversionofjnlissue1en
dc.relation.isversionofjnldate2004
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpages124-156en
dc.relation.isversionofdoihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00153-2en
dc.description.sponsorshipprivateouien
dc.relation.isversionofjnlpublisherElsevieren
dc.subject.ddclabelEconomie financièreen


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