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On Two-Player Repeated Games with Lack of Information on One Side and State-Independent Signalling

Renault, Jérôme (2000), On Two-Player Repeated Games with Lack of Information on One Side and State-Independent Signalling, Mathematics of Operations Research, 25, 4, p. 552-572. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.25.4.552.12113

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Type
Article accepté pour publication ou publié
Date
2000
Nom de la revue
Mathematics of Operations Research
Volume
25
Numéro
4
Éditeur
Informs
Pages
552-572
Identifiant publication
Métadonnées
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Auteur(s)
Renault, Jérôme
Résumé (EN)
We consider two-person undiscounted repeated games with lack of information on one side and state-independent signalling and prove the existence of a "joint plan" uniform equilibrium.
Mots-clés
Repeated games; incomplete information; imperfect monitoring; uniform equilibrium; existence of equilibria
JEL
D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory